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DEVELOPING SILENT AND SHADOW ACCOUNTS 
INTRODUCTION 
The quantity of voluntary, unregulated social, environmental and sustainability 
reporting (SER hereafter) in the UK and elsewhere has risen substantially in recent 
years, particularly amongst multinational corporations. Yet such disclosures still fail 
to satisfy some critics who argue that they are selective and unreliable (see, for 
example, Adams, 2004; Owen and O’Dwyer, 2005). Contrary to the rhetorical claims 
which usually accompany modern SER, such disclosures may not augment 
organisational accountability, and may instead be viewed as managerialist attempts to 
resist meaningful organisational change and to control and manipulate stakeholder 
sentiment (see, for example, Owen et al., 2000). Whilst industry itself may promote 
‘self-policing’ voluntary regimes (see, for example, BITC, 2003), some critics argue 
that much more direct intervention, in the form of mandatory regulation of corporate 
disclosure (and/or governance) processes, is necessary to improve the quality of 
modern SER (CORE Coalition, 2003). However, tangible progress in this area has 
been slow, and the last-ditch abandonment of the government’s (already weakened) 
measures in 2005 has ended any immediate prospect of improvements in mandatory 
SER in the UK at least. 
In the absence of complete and reliable ‘official’ SER, and given the apparent 
level of institutional resistance towards this, it seems legitimate to consider whether 
alternative sources of ‘unofficial’ corporate accountability information may be used. 
Such a suggestion is not new; indeed, there is a long history of various forms of what 
is generally referred to as external social reporting (for detailed reviews, see Gray et 
al., 1996; Gallhofer and Haslam, 2003). In general terms, the use of such external 
social reports may be advocated on the grounds that: 
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“first, [they] act as a ‘balancing view’ in the face of the considerable resources 
that organisations have at their disposal to put their own point of view and to 
offer their own emphasis on their activities. Secondly, [they] can be motivated 
by the realisation that if organisations will not discharge their own duty of 
accountability then it is possible for other bodies to do it on their behalf.” 
(Gibson et al., 2001) 
 Against the backdrop of a rapid increase in what are arguably flawed 
corporate SER disclosures, a renewed interest in forms of external social reporting as 
a counterbalance (or ‘counter accounting’)1 to current practice seems worth pursuing. 
Moreover, at the same time as concerns have risen over the quality of modern SER, 
recent advances in information technology and global communications, and the 
emergence of various ‘new social movements’ in civil society have greatly increased 
the availability of ‘unofficial’ accountability information and in turn improved the 
scope for practical development of external social reporting.  
This chapter focuses on the potential of two relatively recent and emerging 
forms of external social reports, which, drawing on the work of Gray (1997) and 
Gibson et al. (2001), may be referred to as ‘shadow’ and ‘silent’ accounts. The 
starting point for silent and shadow accounting lies in the differences which exist 
between what is usually promised by SER and what is generally delivered.  Such 
differences, if studied more closely, may reveal certain ‘gaps’ in disclosure, and it is 
the identification of these gaps, by exploiting the vast increase in public availability 
                                                
1 While a more explicitly political or emancipatory objective for external social reporting (whereby 
such disclosures become tools to educate and empower stakeholders, and challenge existing hegemonic 
social forces) might be thought of as ‘counter accounting’ (Gallhofer et al., forthcoming), detailed 
discussion of this concept is beyond the scope of this chapter. Nevertheless, it is clearly an important 
avenue of research which merits development in its own right (see also Gallhofer and Haslam, 2004; 
Thomson and Bebbington, 2005). Instead, this chapter focuses solely on what might be regarded as 
more ‘conventionally recognisable’ and systematic methods of silent and shadow accounting, that seek 
to address information gaps by producing accounts based on criteria including completeness and 
verifiability. 
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of, and access to, wider sources of information about corporate behaviour, that forms 
the basis of an argument for alternative forms of silent and shadow disclosures. By 
comparison to the ‘official’ social and environmental accountability information 
contained in SER reports currently being disclosed by the organisation, one may 
define these disclosures as: 
(1) the corresponding ‘unofficial’ or silent account of corporate SER, compiled 
from ‘nuggets’ of relevant information obtained via all other formal corporate 
disclosure channels, including company annual reports, press releases, 
marketing campaigns etc., and; 
(2) a shadow account consisting of other relevant accountability information that 
is readily available in the public domain, produced independently of the 
subject organisation, and published externally from it. 
As a possible avenue of empirical development, this chapter explores the 
potential of silent and shadow accounts and reviews the extent to which both 
academics and other interested groups have already begun to explore it. The chapter 
concludes by tentatively outlining the ways such reports might be usefully developed 
further on a practical level. Before doing so, however, the next section of the chapter 
establishes in more detail the background to, and basis for, silent and shadow 
accounts.  
 
MINDING THE GAPS: A BASIS FOR SILENT AND SHADOW ACCOUNTS 
Samples of published SER disclosures have been empirically reviewed in the 
accounting literature to examine the quality of reporting.  Evaluating disclosures is a 
subjective task that may use a wide range of criteria, but the basic principles of the 
AA1000 reporting process guidelines (ISEA, 1999), so often used by disclosers to 
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legitimise their reports, represent an obvious quality benchmark. Yet even when 
judged in detail against these guidelines, and similar frameworks such as GRI (Global 
Reporting Initiative, 2002), disclosures still appear to suffer from significant 
deficiencies (see, for example, Owen et al., 2001; Stittle, 2002; Belal, 2002; Unerman 
and Bennett, 2004; Owen and O’Dwyer, 2005). Indeed, the criticism of modern CSR 
extends further, by questioning the underlying purpose of these ‘cutting-edge’ 
voluntary reporting standards and guidelines, in terms of their implicit managerialism 
(Owen et al., 2000). Together, such concerns point to the existence of a ‘gap’ between 
what is demanded and what is delivered by current ‘best practice’ disclosure regimes 
(Adams and Evans, 2004). This ‘gap’ has been described variously as: a ‘reporting-
performance portrayal gap’ (Adams, 2004); an ‘assurance expectations gap’ (Swift 
and Dando, 2002), a ‘legitimacy gap’ (Moerman and Van der Laan, 2005); and as a 
‘credibility gap’ (Dando and Swift, 2003; Owen and O’Dwyer, 2005). The existence 
of a ‘gap’ has also been identified by industry-sponsored surveys (see, for example, 
ECC Kohtes Klewes and Fishburn Hedges, 2003) as well as by leading NGOs (see, 
for example, Christian Aid, 2003).  
It seems that there may be different possible definitions of this gap. In fact, it 
may be measured in (at least) three different ways. Firstly and most straightforwardly, 
it may be viewed as the difference between the lack of completeness of reporting and 
the comprehensive picture of overall social performance initially promised by 
corporate rhetoric and in voluntary reporting standards. Recent studies, including both 
samples of several high-profile disclosers (Belal, 2002) as well more detailed 
examinations of individual companies (Gray, 1997; Gibson et al., 2001; Adams, 
2004) have demonstrated in compelling ways that current forms of SER, despite 
claims to the contrary, continue to be highly selective in what is measured and 
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communicated to the reader. We will review the evidence presented in these studies in 
more detail later in this chapter. 
Secondly, if SER disclosers are exhibiting undesirable tendencies towards 
selective reporting, then the role of external assurance in the process becomes 
especially important. However, once again critics contend that there are significant 
shortcomings in this part of the SER process. In their review of a sample of assurance 
statements, Owen and O’Dwyer (2005) questioned both the independence of the 
assurance process as well as the extent to which management exerted control over the 
exercise. Such managerialism drew the authors to the conclusion that assurance 
statements are “merely more ‘value added’ for management as they manage key risks 
imposed by various stakeholder groups who need to be controlled” (p. 209). The ‘gap’ 
identified above may also therefore be seen as the difference between the poor 
reliability of given assurances and the credibility promised in disclosure.  
Finally, the gap between what is demanded and what is delivered by current 
SER practice can also be construed as the difference between the controls and 
restrictions placed on dialogue processes and the freedoms and rights of participants 
promised by dialogue organisers (Owen et al., 2001; Unerman and Bennett, 2004). 
‘Stakeholder dialogue’ appears attractive by implying some kind of ‘genuine’ 
consensus-based space for dialogue in which companies will listen and respond to the 
voices of stakeholders. However, it may instead function as a carefully controlled 
marketing instrument in which stakeholders, lured in by the illusion of influence, 
simply ‘teach’ companies about themselves, enabling companies to ‘learn’ to identify 
the most troublesome and/or powerful groups and how to control them more 
effectively (Thomson and Bebbington, 2005). 
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The existence of such gaps in modern SER is a matter of fundamental concern 
because issues of completeness and reliability of SER are central to notions of 
stakeholder accountability (Gray et al., 1996) while confidence in, and integrity of, 
stakeholder dialogues is essential to satisfying notions of stakeholder democracy 
(O’Dwyer, 2005). Following the basic assumptions of accountability theory, the 
development of an effective counterpoint to current practice which seeks to evidence 
the gaps identified above, becomes desirable since an increase in the quantity and 
quality of information (via silent and shadow accounts) may yield a corresponding 
increase in accountability (Gray et al., 1996). Having established a motivation for 
silent and shadow accounts, the next section briefly outlines the history of 
experimentation with external social reporting and reviews the main academic 
research undertaken in recent years. 
 
EXPERIMENTS TO DATE IN SILENT AND SHADOW ACCOUNTING: 
Whilst the broad idea of using externally produced ‘counter-disclosures’ as a remedy 
against perceived deficiencies in the accountability of corporations is well-
established, practical experimentation with this idea has been somewhat patchy. Over 
the last three decades external social reporting has manifested itself in different guises 
without ever fully establishing itself, while its development has been supported and 
sustained by more familiar and long-standing cultural traditions, including 
investigative journalism (Pilger, 2004), as well as (perhaps more significantly) the 
grass-roots activism of various social movements and campaigning pressure groups 
(Lubbers, 2003). In recent years, such traditions have been supported by the internet 
as a medium for the dissemination of ‘counter-information’ (Gallhofer et al., 
forthcoming). The significance of such wider cultural phenomena for the development 
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of new forms of ‘counter-accounting’ is worth emphasising. In fact, current 
experiments with counter accounting and counter information are perhaps more likely 
to owe their existence to civil society and the work of various campaigning NGOs 
than to the efforts of accounting academics. 
The work of organisations such as Social Audit Ltd2 and Counter Information 
Services (CIS) in the 1970s are perhaps the most celebrated of the antecedents of 
modern SER (and counter-SER) practice (see Medawar, 1976; Geddes, 1991; Gray et 
al., 1996; Gallhofer and Haslam, 2003). The name ‘social audit’ is perhaps especially 
eye-catching, and although strictly the intellectual property of the company of the 
same name (and ultimately misleading - the term social account would have been 
more accurate) it has endured and persisted in general usage. In essence, both 
organisations were established to publish ‘counter-information’ as a response to the 
(then) perceived absence of, and demand for, accountability disclosures. The output of 
Social Audit Ltd and CIS was substantial, but it had declined by the mid-1980s, and 
this continued until the emergence in the late 1980s of the popular phrase 
‘greenwash’3 (Greer and Bruno, 1996), which reflected growing social and media 
awareness of possible corporate manipulation of environmental issues (mass 
awareness of which had been invigorated by headlines about global warming). By the 
early 1990s, this had turned into a backlash against the early pioneers of ethical 
consumerism; Body Shop’s claims of social and environmental responsibility were 
especially subject to criticism and even an external ‘social audit’ (Entine, 2003). In 
                                                
2 Despite ceasing publication of its external social reports in 1976, Social Audit Ltd continues to 
operate, although it now focuses more exclusively on the pharmaceutical industry. For more 
information, see http://www.socialaudit.org.uk. 
3 ‘Greenwash’ is now the subject of its own ‘awards’ and was defined at the 2002 Greenwash Academy 
Awards as “the phenomenon of socially and environmentally destructive corporations attempting to 
preserve and expand their markets by posing as friends of the environment and leaders in the struggle 
to eradicate poverty”. 
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the accounting literature, some research was undertaken to review the impact of 
pressure groups on published SER (Tilt, 1994), while calls were also made for 
improved independent ‘monitoring’ of the activities of multinational corporations 
(Bailey et al., 1994), which potentially involved some form of regulated external 
accountability reporting (Bailey et al., 2000).  
By the mid 1990s, the fist experiments in modern SER practice were 
beginning to emerge. As this grew into a rapidly rising groundswell of corporate, 
governmental and media enthusiasm for voluntary social and environmental reporting, 
the use of counter-information techniques waned. Although the quantity of emerging 
SER practice was recognised to relatively low, a sense of optimism drove forward 
attempts to improve ‘best practice’. In academia and beyond, efforts were 
increasingly directed pragmatically at trying to encourage corporations and assist in 
the development of the theory and practice of modern SER (see, for example, Zadek 
et al., 1997).  
In an effort to boost the relatively low volume of disclosure at that time, and 
prompt more critical reflection on the state of SER, Gray (1997) mooted the idea of 
reviving forms of external social reporting. However, rather than simply reproducing 
the approach pioneered in the 1970s by Social Audit Ltd and Counter Information 
Services, Gray devised a new and intriguingly different form of corporate ‘silent’ 
accounting. To illustrate the concept, Gray produced a silent account based on the 
1994 annual report of the large pharmaceutical company Glaxo plc. The simple 
premise of this idea was to identify relevant information from Glaxo’s annual report 
(referred to as ‘silent’ because such information, although published, was not 
‘officially’ labelled or recognised as SER) and to effectively ‘create’ a new piece of 
SER by collating this relevant information in a new document. Silent accounts could 
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be seen not only as a cheap and quick way of increasing disclosures, but also as 
‘greater than the sum of their parts’ by (re)creating a picture of organisational 
accountability based on ‘broad’ areas of activity concerning four ‘key’ stakeholders: 
employees, community, customers and environment; as well a further category 
covering corporate mission and governance issues. These categories were chosen 
partly on the grounds that they typically featured in corporate annual reports. Clearly, 
as Gray himself acknowledged, they were by no means a complete list, but in the 
absence of more complete and inclusive corporate disclosures, a wider picture of 
stakeholder accountability could not be easily generated. Indeed, to overcome this 
problem, Gray appears to envisaged his experiment as an initial test of the feasibility 
of a more complete and coherent form of organisation-centred SER (see especially, 
Gray et al., 1997).  
By the late 1990s, concerns about the pervasive absence of corporate SER 
began to gradually diminish, while a new set of concerns grew over the quality of 
emerging corporate disclosures. To find new ground upon which a critical evaluation 
of SER might be developed, a number of accounting academics started various 
separate research projects which sought to develop new forms of external social 
reporting4.  
Gray’s initial experimentation with silent accounting was radically revised by 
a group of researchers including the same author to incorporate a form of external 
social reporting which was termed ‘shadow accounts’. Shadow accounting 
represented a more familiar rediscovery of the external social reports of the 1970s. 
Crucially, however, in seeking to illuminate further the shortcomings of corporate 
accountability disclosures, it recognised the increasing quantities of, and access to, 
                                                
4 See also the ‘critical financial analysis’ developed and applied to the privatised utilities in the UK by 
Shaoul (1998). 
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counter-information in the public domain. Such information could be relatively easily 
gathered by academic researchers and published, not simply as a separate document, 
but in parallel with ‘unofficial’ silent accounts (or, if they were available, ‘official’ 
SER), using the same categories and subject headings.  
To this end, Gibson et al. (2001) produced a series of combined reports on the 
activities of well-known UK companies, from different industry sectors, which had 
yet to produce their own dedicated social or environmental reports. These pioneering 
silent and shadow accounts presented the reader with a (hitherto unavailable) picture 
of corporate accountability which directly juxtaposed corporate and non-corporate 
sources of information. The accounts were deliberately presented to the reader 
without much additional editorialising or analysis and relied on the information 
gathering exercise alone for their impact. A second, and perhaps less justifiable, 
characteristic of these reports was their relatively uncritical use of shadow 
information sources, which in the Gibson et al. accounts relied mainly on (potentially 
inaccurate) broadsheet newspaper articles. The shadow account did not independently 
establish the veracity or, for that matter, qualify the content of some material as 
allegations rather than accepted fact. Such an approach could in a strict sense be 
construed as potentially libellous, but more importantly it risked implying a double-
standard whereby shadow sources did not need to be subjected to the same scrutiny as 
corporate sources. Nevertheless, despite its possible shortcomings, putting combined 
silent and shadow reports together in this way served as a compelling basis for 
revealing significant gaps in the completeness of corporate (non)disclosure, as well as 
the extent to which easily available shadow information could be used, both to 
illuminate the gaps in knowledge of aspects of corporate behaviour missing from 
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disclosures as well as to challenge the (mis)representation of events portrayed in 
corporate reports.  
 Around the same time as the notions of silent and shadow accounting were 
being developed by Gray and others in the mid to late 1990’s, a separate project on 
external social reporting was undertaken by Adams (2004) to explore what she termed 
the ‘reporting-performance portrayal gap’. Adams’ case study, in contrast to the 
‘silent’ study of a ‘non-reporting’ corporation by Gray (1997), examined a 
corporation (known only by the pseudonym ‘Alpha’) that had been already been 
producing SER for some years. Using the accountability framework set out in the 
established social and environmental reporting standards of AA1000, Adams analysed 
Alpha’s published SER (for the years 1993 and 1999) by contrasting it against what 
the author was able to research and uncover about the chosen company from a wide 
range of (carefully verified) ‘shadow’ external information sources for the same time 
periods. In a broadly similar fashion to the experiments of Gibson et al. (2001), 
Adams uses (and identifies in some detail) a wide range of sources of ‘shadow’ 
information to illuminate the shortcomings of completeness present in SER 
disclosures. Like the Gibson et al. research, these shortcomings included situations 
where (a) shadow information was found to conflict in some way with the comparable 
corporate account, or (b) where shadow information cast light on something material 
to stakeholders which was not included in the SER report.  
Perhaps more than any other recent experiments in external social reporting, 
Adams’ research evidenced clear deficiencies in completeness in the company’s 
voluntary SER. Although the rhetoric of Alpha’s later (and supposedly ‘improved’) 
1999 corporate SER report examined by Adams seemed to imply a narrowing of the 
‘gap’, her study found little evidence of this, and she concluded that, despite several 
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years of development, the disclosure produced by the company under examination 
still suffered from substantial completeness deficiencies, as well as significant audit 
and credibility flaws. By comparison, Adams’ work is more analytical and drew its 
own conclusions in a more ‘editorialised’ style than Gibson et al. accounts. However, 
at the same time, for a number of entirely justifiable reasons (both legal and 
intellectual), the identity of Adams’ chosen company was concealed in the paper, 
whilst the Gibson et al. reports left the company identities (and arguably some of the 
wider value of the work to a non-academic audience) preserved.  
Table 1 below attempts to summarise the main characteristics of each of the 
three experiments reviewed earlier. The basic format of these experiments is 
compared, as well the extent to which each uses an explicit framework. The table also 
attempts to summarise the coverage of each experiment in examining ‘gaps’ in 
completeness, dialogue and assurance. While all three experiments have a clear and 
understandable focus on exploring notions of completeness, the approach of Adams 
(2004) is perhaps the most comprehensive because of the way it combines the basis of 
a recognised framework (i.e. AA1000 and GRI reporting standards) with a relatively 
wider range of shadow information sources and a more explicitly analytical approach 
to the exploration of completeness ‘gaps’.  Adams’ work is also commendable in that 
it acknowledges the importance of other gaps in assurance and dialogue processes 
(although it does not review these issues in as much depth).  
In fairness to the Gray and Gibson et al. experiments, it is important to 
emphasise that Adams’ use of shadow information as an analytical tool is perhaps 
made easier by the fact that she was comparing shadow information against the 
weight of a standalone SER report (within which explicit dialogue and assurance 
processes are supposed to happen) than against a more slight and intangible notion of 
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‘unofficial’ silent accounts (in which such organisational accountability mechanisms 
may not exist).  
Table 1: Recent academic experiments in external social reporting 
 Silent accont of 
Glaxo plc (Gray, 
1997) 
Silent/shadow 
accounts of Tesco 
and HSBC (Gibson 
et al., 2001) 
The ethical, social and 
environmental reporting- 
performance portrayal gap 
at ‘Alpha’ (Adams, 2004) 
Basic format Silent account  Separate silent and 
shadow accounts – 
both with same 
structure 
Comparison of standalone 
SER with shadow information 
for years 1993 and 1999 
Section headings Corporate 
mission/governance 
and four ‘key’ 
stakeholders 
Corporate 
mission/governance 
and four ‘key’ 
stakeholders 
(1) Subject headings cover 
range of four broad 
environmental issues  
(2) Overall coverage of key 
AA1000 and GRI principles 
 
Sources used 
(corporate and 
shadow) 
Company Annual 
Report (1994) 
Company Annual 
Report (2000) 
UK Broadsheet 
Newspapers (WWW 
and CD-ROMs) 
Limited additional 
sources from wider 
media 
Corporate SER Reports (1993 
& 1999) 
Many wider sources from the 
WWW: business related, anti-
corporate NGOs, consumer 
groups, business and trade 
journals, newspaper CD-
ROMs,  etc. 
Source Material 
Presentation 
Quoted excerpts 
from company 
annual report 
Quoted excerpts from 
company annual 
report and shadow 
sources 
Editorialised summaries and 
selective comparisons of SER 
and shadow information  
Analytical framework 
used 
Implicit notion of 
stakeholder 
accountability 
Stakeholder 
accountability 
AA1000/GRI key principles 
Coverage of 
silent/shadow 
accounting 
(in)completeness 
No direct evidence,  
some 
accompanying 
discussion on 
incompleteness  
Presentation of silent 
and shadow 
information in 
parallel, no follow-up 
analysis 
Detailed comparison between 
and analysis of SER and 
shadow information (but only 
where shadow information 
was available) 
Coverage of corporate 
SER credibility/ 
assurance 
None (not 
applicable 
Not covered 
 
Brief outline of quality of 
audit procedures 
 
Treatment of shadow 
accounting 
completeness and 
reliability 
Not applicable Shadow sources not 
qualified or 
independently 
verified  
All shadow sources 
independently verified  
 
Coverage of 
embeddedness/ 
stakeholder dialogue 
None (not 
applicable) 
Not covered Brief coverage of (lack of) 
evidence of dialogue 
Treatment of 
corporate identity 
Corporate identity 
not concealed 
Corporate identities 
not concealed 
Corporate identity concealed 
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COUNTER-INFORMATION, NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND CIVIL 
SOCIETY 
Before further drawing together the strands of ‘silent’ and ‘shadow’ accounting 
research reviewed so far, it is important to first develop the point raised earlier in this 
chapter concerning the significant and ongoing contribution of other parts of civil 
society to forms of external social reporting. As the previous section of the chapter 
noted, it can be argued that much of what academic accountants have done to 
evidence gaps in existing SER has in fact relied on wider sources of counter-
information available in the public domain. The general theme of corporate abuse of 
power has become increasingly prominent (see, for example, Klein 2000; Monbiot, 
2000; Hertz, 2001), as has popular interest in the issue in specific settings such as the 
fast-food or supermarket industries (see, for example, Schlosser, 2002; Blythman, 
2004). In addition, though, this rising mass disapproval towards corporate 
(mis)behaviour has roots in more politically active parts of civil society. Public 
discontent with the social and environmental impacts of modern capitalism has been 
expressed through the activities of what may be termed ‘new social movements’. 
Such social movements include the activities of a range of campaigning pressure 
groups and other non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The work of campaigning 
NGOs in influencing the behaviour of corporations has for many years received 
relatively little attention in the accounting literature (although see, especially, Tilt, 
1994).  
Such work is clearly a potentially vast source of information for shadow 
accounts, and indeed the role of campaigning NGOs in mobilising corporate counter-
information via the internet has now received more attention from some accounting 
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academics (Gallhofer et al., forthcoming). These movements seek to raise global 
awareness of social and environmental issues and to hold organisations more 
accountable by mobilising grass-roots action against corporations and governments 
(Crossley, 2003). Globalisation, the emergence and spread of internet technology and 
the growth of organised, grass-roots social networks have all conspired to create the 
widespread public demand for counter-information about institutional accountability 
practices (Lubbers, 2003). Anti-corporate websites allow disgruntled individuals the 
chance to air their views to a global audience and to involve themselves and share 
information with diffuse networks of like-minded people (Kahn and Kellner, 2005). 
‘Anti-corporate’ campaigning groups such as Corporate Watch5 run websites that act 
as ‘portals’ to a range of electronic information sources, allowing easy access to a 
huge amount of information. 
The significance of ‘grievances’ against modern capitalism and globalization 
within ‘new social movements’, and their focus on perceived moral deficiencies of 
corporate behaviour (Crossley, 2003) resonates strongly with the work of the critical 
accounting community (see, for example, Cooper et al., 2003; Everett, 2003). Indeed, 
NGOs that have chosen to produce their own ‘shadow’ or ‘counter’ disclosures of 
specific corporate targets usually choose corporations that already provide high levels 
of voluntary SER. By arguably failing to close the ‘gap’ required to reassure or 
convince stakeholders, SER is interpreted and labelled by external stakeholder 
representatives as more ‘greenwash’, and thus may actually serve to mobilise action. 
One strategy that seems to be increasingly adopted by some NGOs to tackle such 
                                                
5 See www.corporatewatch.org.uk. 
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corporate ‘propaganda’ is to publish their own counter-information6 in ways which 
directly confront existing corporate-controlled SER. 
 Like the academic studies discussed in the previous section, these external 
‘shadow’ reports seek to the collect and present wider external sources of information 
about the social and environmental impacts of the chosen corporation. To this 
author’s knowledge, the most active NGO in this area (in terms of publishing specific 
corporate ‘shadow’ reports) is Friends of the Earth (FoE). To date FoE (in 
collaboration with other more specific issues-based activist groups) has published a 
number of external social reports such as Failing the Challenge: The Other Shell 
Report 2002 (FoE, 2003a) and the Amec Counter Report 2002 (FoE, 2003b). Shell, of 
course, is a particularly high-profile discloser of SER and its publications have 
frequently been held up as an example of both ‘best practice’ and ‘bad practice’. The 
FoE document was ostensibly a retrospective review of Shell’s 2002 social report, 
which, had it done so, would have reflected the general approach taken in the 
academic accounting domain by Adams (2004) and to some extent by Gibson et al. 
(2001). However, an examination of the content of the report reveals a series of short 
narrative ‘case-studies’ of various communities directly affected by Shell’s multi-
national operations. The scope and structure for these narratives was not explicitly 
pre-defined. Some evidence was based on current data, while other information 
appeared to relate to events that took place much earlier than 2002; some views were 
supported by quotes from community members, others were not; and there was no 
overall ‘mapping’ of Shell’s worldwide operations. Only two pages out of the 28-page 
report dealt with claims made by Shell in its own disclosures, and while the document 
                                                
6 NGOs involved in activism and advocacy will typically use a number of different strategies to engage 
with corporations (Bliss, 2002).  
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explicitly acknowledged the existence of wider sources of third-party evidence on 
Shell’s behaviour, it does not make use of most of this evidence. 
 Rather than using their report to simply state the difference between what 
Shell itself ‘says’ and what other stakeholders ‘know about’ Shell, FoE’s approach is 
heavily editorialised, in that FoE’s objective is really to (in the words of Shell’s own 
PR campaign) ‘tell Shell’ what it thinks of Shell’s behaviour. This may of course be 
an entirely justifiable objective in itself: the notion of an explicit ‘counter-accounting’ 
that is intentionally partial and political is well-established, as this chapter has 
acknowledged. Consequently, and in sharp contrast to the work of Adams (2004), the 
FoE report does not evaluate Shell’s own SER in a systematic way using the 
principles of disclosure standards such as AA1000. It also fails to address some novel 
aspects of Shell’s SER practices, such as its web-based dialogue (but see Unerman 
and Bennett, 2004).  Whilst FoE are in many ways right to draw attention to the 
selective bias and unreliability of the Shell report, they counter this with what is 
arguably an even more selective and unreliable report of their own. The report is 
therefore perhaps better viewed as an interesting piece of ‘investigative journalism’ or 
even ‘counter-propaganda’ that is intentionally provocative, generates media 
coverage, and creates a platform for the ‘voices’ of marginalised stakeholders to be 
heard.  
 Whilst FoE’s work falls short as a piece of systematic ‘shadow’ accounting, 
other examples of NGO-based reporting appear to exhibit characteristics which more 
closely resemble the academic experiments discussed earlier. At the same time as 
British American Tobacco (BAT) was publishing its first social report (BAT, 2002), 
the anti-smoking pressure group Action against Smoking and Health (ASH) produced 
British American Tobacco – the Other Report to Society (ASH, 2002a). In line with 
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most modern SER, BAT claimed that their report was constructed using both the 
AA1000 accounting and audit standard and the GRI disclosure guidelines. It included 
considerable efforts to engage directly with stakeholders through dialogue processes, 
and was also ‘verified’ by an external consultant. In response, the ASH document 
closely shadowed these processes and attempted to evidence in detail areas of 
disclosure where the BAT report fell short of the AA1000 guidelines. The ASH report 
criticised the scope of the social report, arguing that BAT had failed to identify its 
most important stakeholders. It also questioned the credibility and transparency of the 
report, concluding that BAT had failed to provide reliable information to 
stakeholders. ASH also criticised the management of the company’s ‘stakeholder 
dialogue’ process (a dialogue to which it had been invited to but chose to ignore) on 
the grounds that there were “virtually no areas where BAT and ASH can find 
common cause – we characterise BAT’s relationship with public health as a zero-sum 
game” (ASH, 2002b). 
In addition to the reports published by ASH, BAT’s SER disclosures have also 
attracted the attention of accounting academics. Moerman and Van Der Laan (2005) 
echo the work of ASH in critically reviewing BAT’s 2002 social report, while the 
assurance gap in BAT’s reporting has also been criticised elsewhere (Owen and 
O’Dwyer, 2005). Like ASH, Moerman and Van der Laan also use AA1000 and GRI 
frameworks as a benchmark, and their critique of the ‘smoke and mirrors’ of BAT’s 
disclosures shares much in common with the conclusions offered by ASH. However, 
(crucially, from the perspective of this chapter) they do not set out to explicitly 
compare BAT’s report with external ‘shadow’ reports. Their work focuses more on 
discussing the significance of the existence of gaps in BAT’s reporting rather than 
filling in those gaps with shadow information.  
Draft 2 DEVELOPING SILENT AND SHADOW ACCOUNTS 
 
19 
19 
Table 2 below follows the broad format of table 1 earlier in seeking to distil 
the basic characteristics of the NGO-based shadow reports reviewed here. As one 
might expect, NGO-based reporting appears to be more adversarial in its use of 
shadow information as ‘ammunition’ against its corporate target. This stance appears 
to be taken at the expense of a relative weakness in the reports to systematically 
analyse completeness, assurance and dialogue gaps in SER using a clear 
accountability framework. Nevertheless, the ASH report is potentially interesting in 
its specific focus on social reporting and the standards and frameworks used to 
construct the BAT report. ASH also demonstrate an awareness of the importance of 
dialogue and assurance processes. In these respects the ASH report is much more 
closely aligned with the experimentation in the accounting literature reviewed earlier. 
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Table 2: Recent NGO experiments in external social reporting 
 Failing the Challenge: The 
Other Shell Report (FoE, 
2003a) 
British American Tobacco: The Other 
Report to Society (ASH, 2002a) 
Basic format Glossy 28-page ‘mimic’ of Shell 
SER publication 
Simple 46-page text 
Section headings Emphasis on ‘real-life’ accounts 
based on a selective coverage of 
Shell’s impact in specific 
locations 
No stakeholder or issues based 
section headings 
(1) Issues based headings 
(2) Impact in specific locations 
(3) Sub-headings covering implications 
for BAT’s social accounting process 
Additional Sources Not explicitly defined in scope, 
but all referenced. A range of  
media and counter-information 
sources 
Not explicitly defined in scope, but wide 
range of referenced sources covering 
tobacco industry including government 
and scientific evidence, trade, medical 
and marketing journals, anti-tobacco 
campaign groups etc. 
Analytical framework Selective comparisons AA1000 principles 
Coverage of corporate 
SER (in)completeness 
Many comparisons between 
shadow information and SER 
but no systematic coverage 
Draws on shadow and ‘silent’ evidence to 
demonstrate shortcomings in 
completeness with reference to AA1000 
principles 
Coverage of corporate 
credibility/ assurance 
process 
None No detailed review – limited to short 
recommendations 
Coverage of corporate 
stakeholder dialogue 
processes 
None Partial review focusing on direct 
experience of shortcomings indialogue 
process; reasons for rejecting 
participation explained 
Treatment of shadow 
accounting reliability:  
Sources are referenced but not 
verified 
Sources are referenced but not verified 
  
The next section of the chapter attempts to identify the limitations and difficulties that 
are likely to be faced by NGOs, academics and others who might seek to produce 
such reports. Taking this into account, a tentative structure for future experimentation 
with shadow and silent accounting is then presented. 
 
TOWARDS A FRAMEWORK FOR SILENT AND SHADOW ACCOUNTS 
A review of experiments to date with forms of silent and shadow accounting suggests 
that academics and NGOs appear to share an common interest in illuminating the 
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shortcomings of current SER, with a focus on evidencing (at least some) gaps in the 
completeness of published disclosures. By comparison, however, there are some 
interesting differences. The experiments of academics such as Gibson et al. (2001) 
and more especially Adams (2004) appear to offer more rigour and systematic 
coverage; they are more solidly grounded and promising theoretically, in contrast to 
the emerging ‘counter accounting’ reports of NGOs like FoE and ASH which appear 
to be (quite deliberately) partisan and adversarial. This raises important questions 
(which are beyond the scope of this chapter) about the nature and objectives of 
external social reporting, including whether such reports should subscribe to the types 
of standards of completeness and reliability used to measure the quality of (corporate) 
SER, or instead abandon such benchmarks and restrict external social reporting to the 
deliberately selective presentation of ‘counter information’. Indeed, in the context of 
some recent initiatives by high profile campaigning NGOs to move away from 
adversarial tactics and seek to develop more collaborative relationships with 
corporations, the development of more consistent, complete and reliable forms of 
external social reporting could be viewed as a useful platform for constructive 
dialogue. 
Putting such theoretical questions to one side, it is clear that NGO-based 
reports, despite their possible differences in motive, style and substance, will continue 
to provide a valuable resource for collating more systematic shadow accounts, 
particularly in circumstances where they are produced by organisations (such as FoE) 
which are directly active in campaigning for improvements in corporate 
accountability, and which conduct their own primary research. The ex post 
experiments of Gibson et al. (2001) and Adams (2004) could therefore be revisited 
and developed further by using new empirical subjects. However, academic 
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involvement in silent and shadow accounting could also extend more directly towards 
civil society by encouraging and offering guidance to NGOs to produce more 
consistent and complete shadow accounts. In the same way that academics have 
sought to develop organisation-centred SER by experimenting with organisations, 
there is some pragmatic justification for this idea. Publishing shadow accounts 
through NGOs may also help to protect academics from the possible risks surrounding 
the use of counter information and the threat of libel action (although the onus would 
still be on researchers to either qualify or verify any allegations being reprinted); 
while the outputs from such experiments could also be disseminated more widely to a 
non-academic audience. Of course, how these reports should be put together, and how 
they are used within an overall political strategy by NGOs, are clearly important 
issues, especially as there appears to be a lack of consistency amongst the NGO 
reports reviewed in this chapter. On these particular questions, it may be that some 
academic guidance on the development and practical application of silent and shadow 
accounts would be useful7. 
 Drawing on the discussion so far, what lessons may be learnt in terms of the 
practical guidelines that silent and shadow accounting should follow? In some ways 
the most straightforward answer to this question (and following closely from methods 
employed by Adams, 2004) is to apply to silent and shadow accounts the relevant 
principles that are currently used to guide organisation-centred SER. These include 
the current AA1000 and GRI guidelines and standards, which, whilst perhaps not 
‘perfect’, are nevertheless used to good effect by academics to critique current SER. 
In doing so, it seems fair to acknowledge that both silent and shadow accounting 
                                                
7 It is even possible to envisage wider efforts to improve the legitimacy of shadow reporting, for 
example through the invitation to submit shadow reports to existing corporate SER reporting awards 
schemes, or the establishment of expert-reviewed ‘shadow reporting awards’. 
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share the need for clear and explicit frameworks which seek to construct, in as 
complete and transparent a way as is possible, a picture of organisational 
accountability based on the limits of the available information. Managing the 
potentially vast range of available information sources from a diverse range of 
accountability mechanisms requires additional careful thought. In putting to one side 
readily available corporate SER disclosures, the challenge is to identify (within 
defined boundaries of scope) and scour (within defined boundaries of availability and 
verifiability) relevant accountability mechanisms and other information sources for 
‘nuggets’ of useful and material information, and at the same time one might also 
seek to highlight those places where such nuggets do not exist. For silent accounts, 
this is much more restrictive in focusing on the reconstruction of organisational 
(non)disclosure, but in general terms, one may perhaps conceive of a series of ‘layers’ 
which silent and shadow accounts might consist of. These layers may include the 
following:  
(1) statement of objectives (including engagement/follow-up strategy with 
corporation); 
(2) identification of stakeholders (and basis of including/ignoring them);  
(3) organisational accountability mechanisms examined;  
(4) wider shadow information sources used (or rejected?), including clear 
qualification of sources where they are allegations rather than verifiable fact; 
(5) assessment of completeness of corporate (and shadow) accounts, possibly 
including ‘maps’ of information sources and availability of sources; 
(6) assessment of formal stakeholder dialogue processes and outcomes, including 
(where available) additional primary evidence from stakeholders;  
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(7) assessment of level of assurance offered by corporate (and shadow?) 
accountability mechanisms; 
(8) formal invitation to (or evidence of) feedback to the exercise offered to 
company management and stakeholders. 
The development of this tentative structure in practice is certainly challenging, 
especially in mapping the potentially large quantity of shadow information sources, 
and of interpreting and applying the criteria of completeness and reliability. At the 
same time, though, the availability of relevant information, and the potential for 
useful collaboration with NGOs and other external social reporting agencies, present 
many interesting opportunities for future research. 
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